Nuclear Weapons Operations

Updated 24 January 2024

Nuclear Weapons Maintenance, Storage, and Transport


Nuclear Weapons maintenance buildings, spaces and storage locations in structures, ships, and submarines contributed to significant ionizing radiation risks and subsequent exposures to Nuclear Weapons Technicians. Typical land-based maintenance facilities varied in size and supported one to approximately twenty weapons or more.

Storage facilities were constructed in different sizes and materials from earth-covered concrete and steel structures to small storage bays with a roll-up metal door similar in size to a one-car garage. They held from one to approximately 40 live nuclear weapons that were typically double stacked and placed side-by-side within inches of one another. Standing or kneeling between double stacks of weapons, being inches from several nuclear weapons at the same time (all emitting ionizing radiation) was routine, as storage locations were frequently filled to their physical capacity, often in violation of DOE/DOD Nuclear Safety Criteria.1

Nuclear weapons were routinely stored in ship’s magazines, to full capacity, and in many circumstances, personnel were authorized to sleep in the magazines with the weapons, particularly on deployment in certain areas when the magazines were the coolest spaces on the ship.2

Nuclear Weapons Technicians, working in nuclear weapons storage structures/magazines, drank fluids and ate snacks or lunch while sitting on bolsters (nuclear bomb carts with casters) with their butts over the warhead section, and leaned against various series and configurations of nuclear bombs. When conducting tasks with those weapons, it was often impractical to secure the structure and walk or drive back to the maintenance building for a break, so we improvised. Nuclear Weapons Technicians, supervisors and managers were not made aware of the actual intrinsic radiation dangers; and ionizing radiation safety programs and requirements were not promulgated nor enforced by the upper echelons.




Military services operated under increased plutonium storage limits from July 1977 to (at least) November 1980 without authorization in the joint DOE/DOD Technical Publication 20-7, Nuclear Safety Criteria. The critical nuclear weapon safety violation (and personnel radiation exposure danger) was reported to the 1980 Carter-Reagan Transition team: 3

    “Plutonium (Pu) Storage: In July 1977 the Military Liaison Committee (MLC) approved a recommendation to increase storage limits for plutonium bearing weapons. The joint DoE/DoD Technical Publication, TP20-7, Nuclear Safety Criteria, still contains the original storage limits. DNA has agreed (18 Nov 80) to conduct a comprehensive study of the plutonium hazard…”
    “Current status: The Services are operating under the increased limits. TP20-7 must be changed to acknowledge current Service positions, or the practice discontinued…” [emphasis added] “Alternatives/Rationale… Study: Long term (total evaluation of all aspects of Pu limits for both transportation and storage).”

In 2001, a Department of Energy representative wrote: "...that [increase] roughly amounted to 300%". Context regarding that statement includes the following: 4

    The Origins and Evolution of S2C at Sandia National Laboratories: 1949 to 1996.
    ⚊ Section 6.24 The DoD/DOE Plutonium Dispersal Analysis Group, 1977-1981

      "After a several-year hiatus, the issue of increasing the limitation on the quantity of plutonium-bearing nuclear weapons allowed to be in an ensemble for logistical storage or transportation was revived. On July 28, 1977, DoD/MLC [Military Liaison Committee] Chairman Don Cotter announced that the MLC had approved an increase for storage "that roughly amounted to 300%. The DoD/DNA Headquarters tasked its Field Command at Kirtland AFB to "take the necessary action to change TP 20-7 to conform..." The TP 20-7 Nuclear Safety Crileria [sic] is a technical manual published through the Joint Nuclear Weapons Publication System (JNWPS). Any change to it requires the concurrence of at least three agencies: a military service, the DoD via its DNA, and the DOE via DOE/AL. Obtaining concurrence of the last-named also involves concurrence by the appropriate combination of the DOE's weapons laboratories. I led the process whereby DOE declined to concur, and the matter quickly escalated in DoD/DOE management-level attention."

      Attempts to accommodate the DoD's desires for operational flexibility and economies and the DOE's concerns about safety continued for about a year, mostly in the form of wordsmithing exercises for the text and footnotes of TP 20-7. The three DOE weapons laboratories held fast to the conviction that the proposed blanket increase was ill-advised and suggested as an alternative that each specific situation should "require evaluation of the peculiarities of the particular site by technically qualified persons who consider the hazards both to the individuals at site boundaries and to the general populace." (My words contained in a memo by Jack Howard, Ref. 107). This position was presented to the MLC orally on October 4, 1978, by Jack R. Roeder of DOE/AL and Bob Luna of SNLA."

      Author:
      William L. Stevens, Consultant to Surety Assessment Center, 12300
      September 2001
      Sandia National Laboratories
      Albuquerque, New Mexico, 87185

Nuclear Weapons Technicians literally worked in three-dimensional ionizing radiation fields

Nuclear weapons emit ionizing radiation in all directions at all times. Whenever two or more nuclear weapons were in the same location, and within close proximity to Nuclear Weapons Technicians, we were bombarded with gamma and neutron radiation—neutron in particular—from multiple sources at the same time.

While military veteran Nuclear Weapons Technicians worked in these conditions during the Cold War period, most were not informed of the intrinsic radiation that was emitted through the weapon case 24/7, and few were aware of the penetration power of neutron radiation nor of the neutron interaction in fissile assemblies. 5 We were familiar with alpha, beta and gamma radiation and were continuously assured that any concerns about radiation exposures were unwarranted and that radiation-related dangers did not exist. We were not aware that alpha radiation had a twenty-times higher level of biological damage than gamma, and that neutron radiation had a five-to-twenty-times higher level depending on energy. Generally, there was no relevant and related education, training, or discussion.

Tens of thousands of military veterans felt safe and never seriously considered the possible existence of dangerous levels of ionizing radiation exposure; or never asked or spoke about it. In general, few precautions were required or observed, and questions or complaints were discouraged and certainly not welcome. The silence, arguably deadly silence, was apparently condoned to the highest echelons—as the mission was the first priority. Silence (both directions of communications) seemed to have acted as a type of placebo, as may have otherwise been used in a unique decades-long experiment where the subjects were not aware, eliminating any possible opportunity to accept or refuse.

During the Cold War period, and still unknown to most, Nuclear Weapons Technicians were not aware of scientific-based studies of required separation distances for subcritical units emitting radiation. Such studies were conducted by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (former Department of Energy) and documented in a 1962 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory report: “Interaction of Fissionable Units”. 6

Nuclear Weapons Movement/Transport/Security


Nuclear Weapons Technicians pushed live nuclear weapons on bolsters at many land-based locations, on aircraft, and ships. Some were lifted manually (e.g., nuclear artillery shells and small atomic demolition munitions) as a transport method. Nuclear weapons required unique handling during submarine on-load/off-load logistics procedures, and on ships during underway replenishment (UNREP) and vertical replenishment (VERTREP) operations.

Underway Replenishment (UNREP) between two ships at sea. A common method used to transfer fuel, food, ammunition, parts, personnel and nuclear weapons. Note the nuclear weapon in this photo. Source: Sandia National Lab video "Early Nuclear Safety", 2010.

Routine method of moving nuclear weapons between special aircraft service stores (SASS) and other spaces/levels/decks on ships, and between nuclear weapons maintenance buildings and storage structures. Source: Sandia National Lab video "Early Nuclear Safety", 2010


Nuclear Weapons Technicians loaded, flew with, and unloaded nuclear weapons transported by military helicopter and other aircraft. Army FM 55-204, Air Transport of M454 Atomic Projectile, 30 September 1976 7 and the subsequent December 1981 version stated: “Personnel dosimetry (film badge) is not required for personnel engaged in operations prescribed in this manual nor do the operations require keeping a record of exposure times. However, do not stay within 1 meter of the M454 projectile any longer than is needed to accomplish each operation.” [underline added] Personnel who participated in these operations stated that due to available space in the aircraft, the one-meter distance was not physically possible to maintain under most circumstances.

This certainly would have been the "normal" case, since, as also reported in the Sandia National Laborotories 2001 document: "The Origins and Evolution..." mentioned above. The document stated that aircraft transport of nuclear weapons loaded to physical capacity was a primary goal of military officials, with the intention of reducing the number of required flights for the same number of weapons transported, saving $18 million annually as a result. 8

Nuclear Weapons Technicians in overseas Theater Nuclear Forces (TNF) areas conducted frequent exercises to maintain proficiency in “…violent Emergency Destruction (ED) to prevent terrorist or host nation seizure of nuclear weapons”. 9 The ED exercises required handling every live nuclear weapon at each location (storage structures, alert aircraft hangars, and maintenance facilities). Urgency, time limits based on possible hostile force situations, and nuclear weapons security were the highest priorities before our personal safety, for obvious reasons. In many areas, protective MOPP 10 gear was not assigned to Nuclear Weapons Technicians. It would have slowed the process considerably and may have facilitated damage to the ED materials/devices and the live nuclear weapons. The Air Force prohibited wearing “…complete chemical ensembles when handling war reserve nuclear weapons” during peacetime. 11 Nuclear Weapons Technicians were trained and maintained proficiency in use of rifles, handguns, and small explosives (C-4, blasting caps, shaped charges, thermite incendiary devices, etc.), and carried firearms to provide “close-in” armed security at overseas nuclear weapons maintenance facilities and storage structures.

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Footnotes:

[1] Defense Nuclear Agency, Carter-Reagan Transition Briefing Book, December 1980, https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/Other/Carter_Reagan_Transition-6.pdf
[2] James Little, CWO4, USN, Retired. Summary/excerpt from 19 July 2021 written statement.
[3] Ibid.: Defense Nuclear Agency, Carter-Regan Transition Briefing Book.
[4] SAND99-1308, The Origins and Evolution of S2C at Sandia National Laboratories: 1949 to 1996, internal memorandum, September 2001, declassified/redacted copy. Author William L. Stevens, Director, Surety Assessment Center, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM.
[5] “When two or more pieces of fissile material are brought near together, the neutron output of each piece exceeds its output in isolation due to neutron exchange and multiplication between the pieces.” Neutron Interaction in Fissile Assemblies, https://ncsp.llnl.gov/sites/ncsp/files/2021-11/ref_123.pdf.
[6] Interaction of Fissionable Units, H.K. Clark, Savannah River Laboratory, Aiken, South Carolina, 9 September 1962. https://ncsp.llnl.gov/sites/ncsp/files/2021-11/ref_121.pdf.
[7] Army FM 55-204, Section 4 Note, Air Transport Procedures, Transport of M454 Atomic Projectile in M467 Container, 20 September 1976; and Army FM 55-204, Section 3-1a Note, Air Transport Procedures Transport of M454 Atomic Projectile by US Army Aircraft, 15 November 1980, with change 1, 1 December 1981.
[8] Ibid.: SAND99-1308, The Origins and Evolution of S2C at Sandia National Laboratories: 1949 to 1996... Section 612 Plutonium Mass Limit Controversies, 1975-1976 (regarding transportation plutonium-bearing nuclear weapons by logistical aircraft). "An early initiative of Don Cotter as chairman of the DoD's Military Liaison Committee (appointed in the fall of 1973) was to direct the DoD's Defense Nuclear Agency to conduct a study on nuclear stockpile operating and support costs. As a part of this study, a Field Command Unit of DNA (located in Livermore and then under Colonel Marvin B. Sullivan. USAF) conducted a study to examine economic, health hazard, and political costs of long-range transportation of plutonium-bearing nuclear weapons by logistical aircraft. Colonel Sullivan used probability-versus-consequence diagrams to develop an argument that the DoD's public responsibility demands a low-risk policy, and the number of flights should be reduced by increasing the number of nuclear weapons carried by an aircraft up to the maximum physically practicable, rather than to observe the existing Pu mass limit. In some cases the existing limit resulted in being able to load only a few weapons per aircraft. He further argued that the political risks support his position, since the risk falls as the number of flights decrease. Cost savings of about $18 million per year were estimated."
[9] Defense Nuclear Agency, Carter-Reagan Transition Briefing Book, December 1980 (U). Declass. package p.8.
[10] MOPP – Mission Oriented Protective Posture gear for use by U.S. military personnel in a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear environment.
[11] Air Force Instruction 91-101, Air Force Nuclear Weapons Surety Program, 1 March 1997.