Ionizing Radiation Safety

There is substantial evidence through official regulations, manuals, instructions, meeting summaries, approved and accepted work practices, and shared knowledge to demonstrate that requirements for INRAD exposure safety education and procedures; and the concept now known as ALARA (As Low As Reasonably Achievable) via time, distance, and shielding; essentially did not exist during the Cold War period. Many who were aware of certain limited benefits of shielding gamma radiation with lead were not aware, until years later, that lead was not effective for blocking neutron radiation. In fact, most of us were not then aware of the continuous presence and subsequent danger of neutron radiation emitting from the weapon surfaces (INRAD).

Searches for formal requirements related specifically to Nuclear Weapons Technicians’ ionizing radiation exposure safety during the Cold War period resulted in few publicly available documents. Generally, requirements that specifically addressed ALARA in relation to both nuclear weapons and INRAD, were first published in late 1990. Examples of search results include:

• Army FM 55-204, Air Transport of M454 Atomic Projectile, 30 September 1976, and December 1981 versions stated that personnel dosimetry badges and exposure time records were not required during the nuclear weapons transport operations.
• Army and Defense Logistics Agency Regulation AR 40-14/DLAR 1000.28, Medical Services, Control and Recording Procedures for Exposure to Ionizing Radiation and Radioactive Materials, 15 March 1982. The regulation discussed ALARA, personal dosimeters, radiation dose limits, and dose sources. It was apparently intended for NRC licensed material and did not specifically address nuclear weapons except to exclude any Radiation Control Committee responsibilities for nuclear weapons. It did not discuss INRAD.
• DOD Instruction 6055.8, Occupational Radiation Protection Program, 31 March 1989, included general information on ionizing radiation, personnel dosimetry, bioassay, and ALARA. It was not specifically for nuclear weapons and did not discuss INRAD. It included a definition for Occupational [radiation] Exposure: “Routine exposure of DoD personnel to radiation associated with DoD operations during performance of their official duties.”
• AFR 122-28, Air Force Nuclear Weapons Intrinsic Radiation (INRAD) Safety Program, 29 October 1990, implemented INRAD safety, including ALARA. The regulation "…applies to units and personnel concerned with maintenance, loading, security, transport, or storage of nuclear weapons and associated nuclear material and components.” The regulation described ALARA as: “Keeping exposure of persons to ionizing radiation ALARA consistent with operational requirements and not intentionally exposing persons to INRAD levels exceeding the maximum permissible dose (MPD) specified in DODI 6055.8 and AFR 161-8, Control and Recording Procedures—Occupational Exposure to Radiation”. Introduced the use of personal dosimetry and listed exposure limits for pregnant females.
• Air Force Policy Directive 91-1, Nuclear Weapons and Systems Surety, 21 May 1993. Addressed ALARA and INRAD.
• Air Force Instruction (AFI) 91-108, Air Force Nuclear Weapons Intrinsic Radiation (INRAD) Safety Program, 29 Nov 1993, replaced AFR 122-28, 29 Oct 1990 (listed above).
• Nuclear Task Force investigation report: Reinvigorating the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise, Air Force Nuclear Task Force, 24 October 2008. The report detailed failures in INRAD and ALARA safety programs (described below).
• AFI 91-108, Air Force Nuclear Weapons Intrinsic Radiation and 91(B) Radioactive Material Safety Program, 21 September 2010 , with change 1, 14 October 2011, replaced the 1993 version of AFI 91-108 and added the 91(B) Radioactive Material Safety program.
• DOE-DTRA TP 4-1, Glossary of Nuclear Weapons Material and Related Terms, 30 July 2016, ALARA: “Refers to Service and DOE radiation protection programs to keep radiation doses as low as reasonably achievable.” INRAD: “Ionizing radiation emitted through the weapon surface or directly from exposed weapon components.”

Nuclear Task Force 2008 Report Cited Failures by the Air Force to Provide Adequate INRAD and ALARA Programs to Nuclear Weapons Personnel ¹

After Air Force incidents in 2006 and 2007, the Secretary of Defense ordered a Nuclear Task Force to examine numerous nuclear forces management and nuclear weapons-related problems. Among many deficiencies and recommendations, the 140-page, 2008 report cited inadequate INRAD and ALARA personnel radiation exposure and monitoring practices:

"Inadequate Guidance”

“Air Force documentation was inadequate to demonstrate that current personnel and area radiation exposure and monitoring practices are sufficient to ensure exposure is less than Air Force requirements and maintained as low as reasonably achievable. No evidence or recent oversight of this program by authorities, either external or internal, was found.”

"Improve Weapons Maintenance and Storage Safety"

• "Air Force will update and standardize the intrinsic radiation (INRAD) program guidance in AFI 91-108."
• “Air Force Surgeon General as lead, with AF/SE and Air Force Inspection Agency, will develop an INRAD Safety Inspection Checklist and evaluate requirements, training practices, and assessment of intrinsic radiation monitoring programs to ensure that exposure levels are tracked and are as low as reasonably achievable [ALARA].”

Note: These failures identified by the Nuclear Task Force were disclosed approximately eighteen years after detailed INRAD and ALARA programs were implemented by the Air Force, and with far fewer nuclear weapons maintenance personnel to train and monitor due to the nuclear weapons stockpile reductions. Those formal disclosures—from the highest levels of the Department of Defense—strongly reinforce many arguments and related facts presented throughout The Sound of Silence Project.